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Abstract 
 
In this paper we study the consequences of a hypothetical multi-pillar pension system in Peru. 
We use unique administrative records of workers to estimate distributions of future pensions 
for the actual and multi-pillar system and assess the effects on pension inequality, pension 
liability and overall welfare for the insured population. Our results show that the large pension 
inequality and liability of the actual pension system can be substantially reduced with welfare 
preserving policies. As we consider different types of social welfare functions, our simulations 
illustrates, that when one considers welfare, it is important to define the implied value 
judgments, which are not universally agreed upon. Thus, the goal of this study is not to advice 
for a particular scenario of reform, but highlight the trade-offs that have to be made explicit in 
order to take the best possible option, which can be useful for policy-makers who intend to 
carry out a next generation of pension reforms in Latin America in the near future. 
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1. Introduction 
 Inspired by the 1981 Chile reform, a number of Latin American countries have 
implemented Defined Contribution (DC) pension systems during the last two decades based on 
individual capitalization accounts and managed by the private sector. Some countries 
completely dismantled their public Defined Benefit (DB) systems (such as Bolivia, Chile, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Mexico) whilst others kept these systems in order to 
complement the private scheme in an integrated system (Argentina, Costa Rica and Uruguay). 
Different from this practice, only Colombia and Peru maintained both public and private 
pension systems as two competing schemes. Arenas de Mesa and Mesa-Lago (2006) offer more 
details on these reforms. During recent years, Latin America has been experiencing a second 
wave of reforms, again under the influence of a major reform carried out in Chile in 2008. The 
idea behind these second generation reforms is to tackle the problems of low pension coverage, 
high administrative fees and old-age poverty. Kritzer et al. (2011) list some recent attempts in 
Colombia, Peru and Mexico and emphasizes on the major Chile’s reform. The Chilean reform 
introduced a non-contributory pension based scheme on means-test and a top-up pension 
scheme with the aim of enhancing pension wealth. As a consequence, it is expected to result in 
a reduction in old-age poverty and pension inequality. This type of reform and the recent rise 
of non-contributory pension schemes in Latin America (see Bosch et al., 2013) indicate, to 
some extent, that pension policy must also include measures to reduce old-age poverty and 
consequently pension inequality. This is an important shift with respect to the pension reforms 
20 years ago, which were mostly focussed on financial sustainability. Recent evidence suggests 
that inequality and old-age poverty can be reduced in the mixed pension systems and, in 
particular, in the new reformed Chilean pension (Forteza, 2011 and Otero, 2013). 
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Peru started the process of a new pension reform in 20121, but the emphasis was merely 
on changing the scheme of administrative fees and certain administrative processes in order to 
reduce costs in the DC private pension system (SPP, for Sistema Privado de Pensiones). This 
reform overlooked distributive and fiscal problems caused by the competition between the 
private and public (a DB pension system called SNP) pension systems. The official actuarial 
liability of the public pension system is about 34% of GDP while the present value of 
contributions is about 14% of GDP, so the actuarial deficit is about 21% of GDP. This paper is 
motivated by the data presented in figures 1 and 2. The data used in Figure 1 comes from 
different cross-sections of the leading national household survey of Peru (ENAHO) and, with 
some limitations, show an increasing trend in the inequality measured with the Gini index of 
SPP pensions. In contrast, the Gini computed with public pensions is stable around 0.20. As a 
reference, the average Gini index of pensions is 0.158 in the OECD countries (see OECD, 
2013). Currently, the measure of pension inequality in the whole system is not so high because 
the number of SNP pensioners (82%) is much larger than that of SPP pensioners (18%), 
although there is an increasing trend of the relative number of SPP pensioners. For instance, 
the share of SPP pensioners with respect to the sum of SPP and SNP pensioners has increased from 10% 
in 2007 to 18% in 2013. In general, public pensions are lower than private pensions because of 
the regulated minimum and maximum pensions, which in turn cause less inequality. In addition, 
private pensions have almost perfect correspondence with labour income, which explain the 
large inequality observed on these pensions. According to these trends, it is not difficult to 
foresee a continuing increase in the level of overall pension inequality as more SPP affiliates 
will enter into retirement during the coming years. Figure 2 shows the increasing evolution of 
official actuarial liabilities in the public system. Although the present value of contributions 
                                                     
1 The pathway of this reform has not been free of controversy and political pressures. See Valladares (2012) for 
more details on the description and political analysis of this reform. 
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increases over time, this is largely surpassed by the sum of actuarial liability of present and 
future pensions. 
 
Figure 1. Gini index of pensions (2007 – 2013) 
 
 
    Source: National Household Surveys (ENAHO) of Peru, years 2007 to 2013. 
   Author’s elaboration.  
 
 
Figure 2. Actuarial liability in the public pension system (2007 – 2013) 
 
 
    Source: National Pension Office (ONP). Author’s elaboration.  
 
 
 The mentioned facts imply that the actual design of the Peruvian pension system is under 
the threat of facing larger inequality and liabilities.  The existence of two competing pension 
systems does not appear to be reasonable in particular when one of those is a DB system where 
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financial sustainability is precisely based on having an increasing number of contributors. In 
the end, the actual pension design encourages the middle and high income workers to choose 
the private system and the low income workers to opt for the public system. The aim of this 
paper is to study a policy response to this challenge and show the different effects on pension 
inequality, actuarial liability and overall welfare. In particular, we will study the effects of the 
implementation of a multi-pillar pension system that unifies the private and public pension 
systems of Peru. This is also a relevant exercise for other countries in Latin America (especially 
for Colombia) that are experiencing an increase in pension inequality caused by the 
implementation of capitalization accounts. Furthermore, we attempt to contribute with the 
analysis on distributional and welfare consequences of pension reform in Latin America. As 
pointed out by Arza (2008) and Barr and Diamond (2009) the study of distributional impacts 
of pension reforms is still limited in Latin America. 
 Our simulations are performed with unique data composed by administrative records of 
individuals affiliated to the private and public pension systems in December-2006. The strategy 
is to generate counterfactual distributions of future pensions under different scenarios of reform 
and compute actuarial liabilities, inequality and overall measures of welfare in order to compare 
it with the actual situation. The results of the exercises show that pension inequality and pension 
liability produced in the actual pension system can be substantially reduced without much 
overall welfare losses, but only under certain contribution rate values. Therefore, our set of 
different results are useful to highlight the trade-offs between inequality, efficiency and fiscal 
costs of a pension reform. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the Peruvian pension 
system. Section 3 presents the methodology of simulation. Section 4 presents and discusses the 
effects of the reform, and section 5 presents the conclusions. 
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2. The pension system in Peru 
2.1 Actual characteristics  
 The private SPP was established in 1993 as a system based on individual capitalization 
without dismantling the public SNP, and hence individuals must choose one of them2. If the 
SNP is chosen, the insured is able to shift to the SPP, but the opposite is not permitted. If an 
insured moves from the SNP to SPP, the government can entitle a recognition bond (Bono de 
Reconocimiento, RB) to compensate for the contributions made to the SNP in the past. Public 
pensions are bounded with minimum and maximum values and the individual must contribute 
at least 20 years to obtain a minimum pension. There is no general scheme of minimum 
pensions in the SPP, but some old cohorts of workers caught in the reform transition can 
demand it. For this, the individual must be an ex-affiliate of the SNP and show at least a total 
of 20 contributed years to the SNP and/or SPP. The introduction of the SPP attracted a 
considerable number of insured from the SNP along with new workers who preferred to enrol 
in the new system, which weakened the financial sustainability of the pubic system. The net 
actuarial pension liability of the SNP at the time of the data collection (December 2006) was 
US$26 billion (about 23% of GDP). Note that this concept is defined as the present value of 
present and future pensions of the current insured and pensioners minus the present value of 
contributions of the current insured. 
 The 1993 reform has generated a considerable debt. Apart from the mentioned actuarial 
deficiency, there is US$4,700 million in current terms corresponding to recognition bonds; and 
a cost of US$2,137 million in actuarial terms due to the implementation of the Law 288913 
(MEF, 2007; MEF, 2008). Only salaried employees of the formal sector are mandated to enrol 
                                                     
2 The SPP is supervised by the Superintendence of Banking and Insurance (SBS) and the SNP is administrated by 
the Bureau of Pensions (ONP). 
3 Under restricted circumstances, the Law 28891 (Ley de desafiliación) allows some SPP insured to return to the 
SNP. 
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in the pension system, which means that self-employed, employers and informal sector 
employees can choose voluntarily to enrol or not. Since the informal sector in Peru is huge and 
incomes are low, pension enrolment may not be an optimal choice for informal workers4; hence 
the enrolment rate is small. Only about 25% of the population over 65 years old receive a 
pension. 
2.2 The design of a multi-pillar pension system 
 The hypothetical multi-pillar pension system (MPP) can be implemented as the merger 
between the actual SNP and SPP, provided that the State recognizes the contributions made to 
any of these systems. In fact, the MPP will offer a minimum pension guarantee -similar to that 
of the SNP- to the individuals who are able to show 20 contributed years to any pension system, 
which is equal to the actual number of contributions required in the SNP. These contributions 
have to correspond to wages that are not lower than the official minimum wage. In addition, 
the insured previously enrolled in the SPP is allowed to keep her pension balance. Each insured 
will contribute a rate 𝛼 of wages to her own individual capitalization account and a rate 𝛽 of 
wages to a solidarity fund, which will help to finance the minimum pension guarantee. At 
retirement age, the pension is computed with the total pension balance and, if needed, topped 
up with additional resources from the solidarity fund to reach the value of a minimum pension. 
 As envisaged, the solidarity fund corresponds to the first pillar, while the individual 
capitalization accounts correspond to the second pillar. Note that the first pillar is financed by 
the contributions (rate 𝛼) paid by all the insured and, possibly, with public transfers if the 
solidarity fund is not enough. The second pillar is financed completely by the wages (rate 𝛽) 
of the insured. The MPP is a significant change with respect to the actual situation. The reform 
extends the minimum pension guarantee to the SPP affiliates and has the potential to reduce 
                                                     
4 The informal sector was 55% of labour force in 2007 according to ILO (2009). 
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actuarial liabilities, which in turn may improve the allocation of public expenditures. The 
Government regularly transfer resources to pay the SNP pension payroll as the individual 
contributions are not enough. For example, the Government transferred about 0.73% of GDP 
to pay SNP pensions. This means that tax revenues (which are collected from all workers 
regardless of whether or not they are enrolled in pensions) are used to pay the pensions for a 
fraction of the population, which reinforces inequality. This is particularly critical due to the 
fact that the group of enrolled workers is much more advantaged (higher incomes, better 
education, stable contracts, etc.) than the non-enrolled. 
3. Data and methods  
 The effects of the reform are simulated by computing, first, the pensions of all individuals 
insured in the SNP, SPP and MPP; and then, the corresponding actuarial liabilities. The 
resulting distributions of pensions are used to compute pension inequality measures and 
pension averages and, therefore, welfare indexes. We estimate the effects of the proposed 
reform by comparing the actual and counter-factual distributions of pensions and pension 
liabilities. As mentioned before, 𝛼 and 𝛽 represent the percentage of individual’s salary 
contributed to the solidarity fund and the individual capitalization account, respectively. We 
will use different values for these percentages in order to obtain different scenarios of reform. 
For comparability reasons we must choose values for 𝛼 and 𝛽 such as the contribution rate is 
𝛼 + 𝛽 = 10%5.  
                                                     
5 The contribution rate in the SPP and SNP is 10% and 13% of salary, respectively. In addition, the AFP charges 
an administrative fee and collects the insurance premium that covers the risks of disability and death. The averages 
of the fee and insurance premium were 1.81% and 0.88%. Overall, the insured of the SPP and SNP pay a rather 
similar percentage of their salary. 
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3.1 Data 
The data is composed of two representative samples of individuals registered in the 
administrative records of the SNP and SPP in December 2006. The database contains 
information on wage, age, sex, age of enrolment in the SPP, pension balance, BR value and its 
corresponding number of contributions. These samples are random and stratified by sex and 
age. Although this information dates from Dec-2006, our exercise is still relevant to analyse 
the Peruvian pension system as no structural reforms have been undertaken. After dropping 
records with inconsistent and missing information, the sample size in the SPP and SNP consist 
of 31,719 and 26,168 individuals, respectively. The simulation results use sample weights to 
account for the relative size of the SPP and SNP population. 
3.2 Computation of pensions 
The pensions of the SNP are computed following their specific pension rules, i.e. taking 
into account minimum and maximum pension values and particular replacement rates. The 
pensions of the SPP are computed with a simple capitalization process as the following: 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑘
𝑠𝑝𝑝 =
0.10∑ (𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑠𝑝𝑝
𝛽𝑧−𝑗)
𝑧
𝑗=𝑘
+𝐶𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑘𝛽
𝑧−𝑘+𝑅𝐵𝑖𝑘
𝐴𝑧,𝑦
                                       (1) 
𝐴𝑧 = 12 (∑
𝑝𝑧,𝑧+𝑡
𝛿𝑡
𝑀−𝑧
𝑡=0
)                                                         (2) 
𝐴𝑧,𝑦 = 𝐴𝑧 + 12𝜃𝑠𝑝𝑝 (∑
𝑞𝑦,𝑦+𝑡(1−𝑝𝑧,𝑧+𝑡)
𝛿𝑡
𝑀−𝑦
𝑡=0
)                           (3) 
𝛿 = 1 + ?̂?;   𝛽 = 1 + 𝑟                                                       (4) 
 
Where subscripts 𝑖, 𝑘 and 𝑧 indicate the individual, age at Dec-2006 and legal retirement 
age (equal to 65). 𝑃𝑖𝑘
𝑠𝑝𝑝
 is the pension computed at retirement. 𝑤𝑖𝑘 is the annual wage, 𝑟 is the 
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yearly pension fund return rate and 𝑑𝑖𝑘
𝑠𝑝𝑝
 is the density of contributions, which ranges from 0 
to 1. The pension capital is composed by the contributions made between age 𝑘 and 𝑧 (first 
component of the right hand side of equation 1), the balance accrued up to Dec-2006 and their 
returns, and the Recognition Bond (𝑅𝐵𝑖𝑘). The pension capital must be divided by the annuity 
price 𝐴𝑧,𝑦 in order to obtain the pension amount. The annuity price is defined as the discounted 
capital needed to finance a monetary unit of life pension. Equations 2 and 3 denote the annuity 
price for a single and a married affiliate, respectively. To calculate the annuity price, we need 
𝑝𝑧,𝑧+𝑡, which is the probability of survival from age 65 to 65+t according to the official 
mortality table; M is the maximum survival age; ?̂? is the annuity discount rate; 𝑞𝑦,𝑦+𝑡 represents 
the widow’s probability of survival from age 𝑦 to age 𝑦 + 𝑡. Note that the fraction 𝜃𝑠𝑝𝑝 
indicates the percentage of pension that a spouse will receive upon the death of the pensioner6.  
 The procedure to compute pensions in the MPP system (𝑃𝑖𝑘
𝑚𝑝𝑝
) is similar to the one 
employed in the SPP, though now the individual can receive a minimum pension (𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑚𝑝𝑝
) if she 
accrues a pension below this amount and simultaneously complies with the minimum required 
number of contribution years (see equation 5). Similar to the current SNP regulation, the 
minimum number of contribution years is 20. 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑘
𝑚𝑝𝑝 =
{
 
 
 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 [
𝛼∑ (𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑚𝑝𝑝
𝛽𝑧−𝑗)
𝑧
𝑗=𝑘
+𝐶𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑘𝛽
𝑧−𝑘+𝑅𝐵𝑖𝑘
𝐴𝑧,𝑦
, 𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑚𝑝𝑝 ]   𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 
𝛼∑ (𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑚𝑝𝑝
𝛽𝑧−𝑗)
𝑧
𝑗=𝑘
+𝐶𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑘𝛽
𝑧−𝑘+𝑅𝐵𝑖𝑘
𝐴𝑧,𝑦
                     𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑
    (5) 
 
                                                     
6 This is 42% in the SPP, and 50% in the SNP. 
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3.3 Actuarial liabilities 
 Equipped with the previous pension formulas, we compute pensions for each individual of 
the sample at the age of retirement (65). Depending on the birth cohort of the individuals, we 
will obtain new flows of pensions in different years over the period 2007 to 2050. Thus, a 
particular year of the simulation includes the pensions of the new retirees of that year and the 
pensions of the retirees of previous years. This setting allows us to easily compute actuarial 
liabilities, which are defined as the capital needed to address the payment of current and future 
pensions. This payment is contingent on the life survival probability of current and future 
insured and pensioners. In a defined benefit system such as the SNP and a multi-pillar system 
as defined in this study, these payments should be compared with the present value of 
contributions in order to know the final balance. The methodology of the computation of 
actuarial liabilities is described in the appendix. 
3.4 Parameters and assumptions 
Density of contributions: 
Information regarding the number of individual past contributions are not available, so 
some assumptions have to be made. The goal is to obtain the estimated number of total 
contributions made by each individual between the date of pension enrolment and retirement. 
This will allow us to assess the individual’s eligibility for a minimum pension in the MPP 
system and compute her pensions in the SPP and SNP. We will consider that all individuals 
retire at the legal retirement age, which is 65. The following expressions are used to compute 
the total number of contributions made by the individual: 
 
For SNP:   ?̃?𝑖
𝑠𝑛𝑝 = 𝑡0
𝑠𝑛𝑝
(𝑘𝑖 − 𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑛𝑝
) + 𝑡1
𝑠𝑛𝑝(65 − 𝑘𝑖)                                               (6) 
For SPP:    ?̃?𝑖
𝑠𝑝𝑝 = 𝑎𝑖
𝑅𝐵 + 𝑡0
𝑠𝑝𝑝
(𝑘𝑖 − 𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑝𝑝
) + 𝑡1
𝑠𝑝𝑝(65 − 𝑘𝑖)                                    (7) 
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For MPP:   ?̃?𝑖
𝑚𝑝𝑝 = 𝑎𝑖
𝑅𝐵 + 𝑡0
𝑗
(𝑘𝑖 − 𝑘𝑖
𝑗
) + 𝑡1
𝑚𝑝𝑝(65 − 𝑘𝑖)     𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑗 = 𝑠𝑛𝑝, 𝑠𝑝𝑝      (8) 
𝑎𝑖
𝑗 = {
?̃?𝑖
𝑗     𝑖𝑓   ?̃?𝑖
𝑗 ≥ 20                              
20     𝑖𝑓   ?̃?𝑖
𝑗 < 20  &  65 − 𝑘𝑖 ≥ 20  
?̃?𝑖
𝑗     𝑖𝑓   ?̃?𝑖
𝑗 < 20  &  65 − 𝑘𝑖 < 20
      𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑗 = 𝑠𝑛𝑝, 𝑠𝑝𝑝,𝑚𝑝𝑝                  (9) 
 𝑑𝑖
𝑠𝑝𝑝 =
𝑎𝑖
𝑠𝑝𝑝
−𝑎𝑖
𝑅𝐵
65−𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑝𝑝                                                                                                        (10) 
𝑑𝑖
𝑚𝑝𝑝 =
𝑎𝑖
𝑚𝑝𝑝
−𝑎𝑖
𝑅𝐵
65−𝑘𝑖
𝑗     𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑗 = 𝑠𝑛𝑝, 𝑠𝑝𝑝                                                                  (11) 
 
Where 𝑘𝑖
𝑗
 indicates the age at which the individual enrolled in the pension system j, 𝑎𝑖
𝑗
 is 
the total number of contributed years between age 𝑘𝑖
𝑗
 and retirement age, 𝑡0
𝑗
 is an assumed 
density of contributions between 𝑘𝑖
𝑗
 and current age 𝑘𝑖, 𝑡1
𝑗
 is an assumed density of contributions 
between current age 𝑘𝑖 and retirement age, and 𝑎𝑖
𝑅𝐵 is the number of years contributed to the 
SNP recorded in the BR. Equation 9 computes the number of contribution years in each system 
and assumes that the individual contributes at least 20 years up to retirement (if age permits) in 
order to meet the eligibility criteria for minimum pensions. Equations 10 and 11 represent the 
density of contributions for each individual, which is the share of years contributed in a given 
period of years (between 0% and 100%). These densities are used in equation 1 and 5 to 
compute the value of pensions. In the case of the pension rules of the SNP, the computation of 
pensions requires the number of contributed years instead of the density of contributions 
(equation 9). We will assume that the parameters 𝑡0
𝑗
 and 𝑡1
𝑗
 are equal to 50% for each pension 
system, which is not far from the observed average of contribution density (51.1% in SPP in 
1998-2008, and 47.1% in SNP in 2000-2007). Other more accurate estimated densities in Chile 
and Argentina are of a similar magnitude (Arenas de Mesa et al., 2008; Bertranou and Sánchez, 
2003). 
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Annuity price: 
The annuity price is computed with the official mortality tables currently used in the SPP, 
and it is assumed that each insured has a spouse who is 4 years older/younger, being the male 
always older than the female. The annuity interest rate is 4.6%, which is the official interest 
rate to compute Retiros Programados (withdrawal pensions from the pension fund) in the SPP. 
Because of consistency, the discount interest rate for actuarial liabilities and present value of 
contributions must also be 4.6%. Other authors that estimate pensions in Latin American 
countries use similar rates. For example, Zvinieni and Packard (2002) use a discount rate of 
4%, Holzmann et al. (2004) use values between 2% and 5%. For Peru, MEF (2008) and Bernal 
et al. (2008) use a discount rate of 4%.  
Pension fund return rate: 
The assumed pension fund return rate is 6%, which is similar to other values used in 
pension projections for Peru (Moron and Carranza, 2003; Bernal et al., 2008). 
Pension rules : 
 The minimum monthly pension in the SPP and SNP is S/.484. In the SNP, the wife of a 
pensioner receives a survival benefit equal to 50% of the original pension (or at least S/.315 a 
month). We will assume all these values in the multi-pillar system.  
Other assumptions: 
We assume that prices, wages and pensions are held constant in the simulations, and there 
are no wage premiums based on seniority (due to data unavailability). The simulations do not 
consider the enrolment of new workers in the calculation of pensions and actuarial liability. In 
terms of micro-simulation techniques, our simulation exercise is similar to one of static 
simulation. The inclusion of new workers arriving into the pension system would demand the 
making of simulations and assumptions on fertility, labour supply and the decision of 
enrolment, which is beyond the scope of this study and, importantly, require data that is not 
14 
 
available in the administrative records. However, the design of our simulation exercise is 
sufficient to highlight the trade-offs between inequality, pension debt and welfare. 
We must clarify that we account for mortality differences (by sex and age) of the retirees 
when we add the pensions of different cohorts of retirees in a particular year. For example, the 
set of pensions in year t include the pensions of the new retirees of that year and the pensions 
of retirees of past periods t-1, t-2, and so on, which are accordingly multiplied by the probability 
of life survival. The survival probabilities are elicited from the official mortality tables of the 
SPP. As a result, we will have different sets of computed pensions for each year between 2007 
and 2050, so that we will have a stream of computed distributions and indicators for each year. 
3.5 Equity and welfare 
 The effect on the distribution of pensions is quantified by the Gini coefficient (G) and 
Atkinson Index (Atkinson, 1970). The Gini index is widely used to account for income 
inequality and measures the proportion of the area between the line of prefect income equality 
and the Lorenz curve. This index ranges from 0 to 1, with zero indicating perfect equality of 
incomes and one indicating extreme inequality (total income is owned by only one individual). 
The Atkinson index is built on an explicit ethical basis since it takes into account the inequality 
aversion of the planner (Lambert et al, 2008). This index is defined as A(e); where e is the 
parameter of inequality aversion of the social planner. In the context of pension systems, we 
argue that the Atkinson index may be interpreted as the fraction of national income of pensions 
which can be lost in order to achieve equality in the distribution of pensions. Or in other words, 
it is the price that the planner is willing to pay for complete equality. If e0, the planner is 
neutral to inequality and the index tends to zero, thus the planner is not willing to sacrifice 
pension amounts in exchange for perfect equality. However, a planner that is more averse to 
inequality exhibits an index that tends to 1, and therefore tolerates large losses in pension values 
in exchange for greater equality. Similar to the Gini index, a lower value of the Atkinson index 
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indicates lower inequality for a given value of e. For a population of n individuals (i=1,…,n) 
with pensions ranked in non-decreasing order  𝑃𝑖 ≤ 𝑃𝑖+1, and pension mean equal to 𝜇, the Gini 
and Atkinson indexes are computed as follows: 
 
𝐺 = 2
∑ 𝑖𝑃𝑖
𝑛−1
𝑖=1
𝑛∑ 𝑃𝑖
𝑛−1
𝑖=1
−
𝑛+1
𝑛
                                                       (12) 
 
𝐴(𝑒) = {
1 − [
1
𝑛
∑ (
𝑃𝑖
𝜇
)
1−𝑒
𝑛
𝑖=1 ]
1 1−𝑒⁄
   𝑖𝑓 𝑒 ≠ 1 ; 𝑒 ≥ 0
1 −
1
𝜇
(∏ 𝑃𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 )
1 𝑛⁄  𝑖𝑓 𝑒 = 1                              
                            (13) 
 
 The estimated values of pension inequality indexes and pension means for the different 
scenarios of reform can be readily used to compute Social Welfare Functions (SWF). A key 
property of SWF is that these must be increasing income mean and decreasing in inequality 
(Lambert, 2001). This way, the SWF represents the tension between efficiency and equity. Two 
types of SWF are computed, one with the Gini index and the other with the Atkinson index as 
the following: 
𝑊𝐺 = 𝜇(1 − 𝐺)                                                            (14) 
     𝑊𝐴(𝑒) = 𝜇(1 − 𝐴(𝑒))                                                       (15) 
 
4. Effects of the reform 
4.1 Actuarial liability 
 The actuarial liability of current SNP’s pensioners is not estimated because the new multi-
pillar pension system will not affect the pensions that are already entitled. Therefore, we 
abstract from the present pensioners in the computation of actuarial liabilities and define the 
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expected pension debt as the difference between the actuarial liability of the actual affiliates 
and the present value of their contributions. Our estimation of expected pension debt in the 
actual SNP system is US$9,704 billion (10.4% of GDP) which is close enough to the equivalent 
official figure (US$9,958 billion). We must add to this amount the actuarial liability 
corresponding to minimum pensions that will be granted to few affiliates in the SPP in order to 
obtain the debt of the pension system as a whole. Thus, before any reform, the total expected 
pension debt amounts US$10,296 and represents 11% of GDP (see Table 1’s top panel). 
 
Table 1: Expected pension debt with and without reform (US$ millions) 
 
 
 
 As defined before, the state must chose specific values for 𝛼 and 𝛽 to carry out the 
implementation of the MPP. Table 1 shows the effects of the MPP reform on pension debt 
under 9 different scenarios for these contribution rates subject to 𝛼 + 𝛽 = 10%. Each column 
reports the computed value of the expected pension debt for each contribution rate, which will 
be compared to the baseline of no reform. It is clear that each value of contribution rate will 
have different effects on pension debt, and as we will observe further, the effects on inequality 
and welfare will differ as well. For instance, in the first column only 1% of salary is contributed 
to the individual capitalization account and 9% to the solidarity fund, so that in this scenario 
No Reform
a. Present value of contributions 4,550
b. Actuarial liability of SNP affiliates 14,255
c. Actuarial liability of SPP affiliates 592
d. Pension debt: c+b-a 10,296
α=1% α=2% α=3% α=4% α=5% α=6% α=7% α=8% α=9%
e. Present value of contributions 20,763 18,456 16,149 13,842 11,535 9,228 6,921 4,614 2,307
f. Actuarial liability of affiliates 21,204 19,803 18,522 17,354 16,284 15,305 14,412 13,595 12,848
g. Pension debt: f-e 441 1,347 2,373 3,512 4,749 6,077 7,491 8,981 10,541
Debt reduction: d-g 9,855 8,949 7,923 6,784 5,547 4,219 2,805 1,315 -245
With Reform
Contribution rate to individual account
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the multi-pillar pension system will offer pretty similar pensions to everyone. In this scenario, 
the pension debt is sharply reduced to US$441 million, so the State may save up to US$9,855 
million (about 10.5% of GDP). Of course, though instructive, this is an extreme scenario 
because equal benefits for everyone irrespective of salary differences will create large 
disincentives to contribute. However, if the contribution rate to the individual accounts is 
higher, as shown in the next columns of Table 1, the State may still obtain substantial reductions 
in expected pension debt. The other extreme case occurs when the contribution rate to the 
solidarity fund is only 1% and the contribution to the individual account is 9%. In this scenario 
the multi-pillar system would be more similar to the actual SPP although providing a general 
minimum pension. Instead of generating debt reductions, this scenario slightly raises the 
expected pension debt by US$245 million7. A social planner that is solely interested in reducing 
pension debt will chose the scenario with the lowest contribution rate to the individual 
capitalization account. This choice might also lead to less pension inequality, but it could also 
reduce the welfare of the pensioners and disincentive contribution.   
4.2 Equity and welfare 
 Table 2 reports the indexes of pension inequality and pension means in the actual system 
disaggregated by SPP and SNP and in the proposed multi-pillar system. Given that in our 
simulation exercises we obtain the pension inequality indexes for each distribution of each year 
of the period 2007-2050, we must use a summary indicator or a reference period to compare 
the inequality arising from the reform and that from the actual system. We use the average of 
the Gini or Atkinson index obtained in the whole period. The same principle is applied to the 
case of pension means. 
 
 
                                                     
7 This occurs because the multi-pillar system –different from the actual pension design- also guarantees a minimum 
pension to SPP affiliates. 
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Table 2: Pension inequality indexes and means 
 
 
 
 A first look at the pension system before any reform evidences how different the SPP and 
SNP transmit inequality from labour to retirement. For instance, in the second row of Table 2’s 
top panel one can observe that in the SNP the Gini of the affiliates’ wages is 0.397 but the Gini 
of the retirees’ pensions is only 0.117. In contrast, the Gini of wages in the SPP is 0.507 and 
the Gini of pensions is 0.563, so that the pensions granted in the SPP can exacerbate the 
inequality observed in wages. Overall, we observe that the actual pension system as a whole 
almost perfectly transmit the inequality from wages (Gini 0.496) to pensions (Gini 0.488). 
Evidently, the SNP reduces income inequality because of the minimum and maximum values 
of the pension. The SPP transmit income inequality to pensions because of the individual 
capitalization scheme. In particular, the greater inequality observed in pensions with respect to 
incomes in the SPP can be explained by the fact that younger cohorts of affiliates have more 
time to capitalize more funds and obtain better pensions than older cohorts with whom they 
will be compared to estimate the inequality index.  
SNP SPP Total SNP SPP Total
Pension mean 566.2 827.2 775.9 1003 1562.1 1446.4
Gini 0.117 0.563 0.488 0.397 0.507 0.496
Atkinson (e =0.1) 0.004 0.062 0.050
Atkinson (e =0.5) 0.018 0.270 0.215
Atkinson (e =1.0) 0.010 0.313 0.204
Atkinson (e =2.0) 0.057 0.696 0.634
Atkinson (e =2.5) 0.067 0.770 0.725
α=1% α=2% α=3% α=4% α=5% α=6% α=7% α=8% α=9%
Pension mean 640.6 655.1 670.5 686.9 704 721.8 740.3 759.5 779.2
Gini 0.351 0.361 0.371 0.380 0.390 0.398 0.406 0.414 0.421
Atkinson (e =0.1) 0.036 0.037 0.038 0.039 0.040 0.041 0.042 0.042 0.043
Atkinson (e =0.5) 0.156 0.159 0.163 0.166 0.170 0.173 0.177 0.180 0.183
Atkinson (e =1.0) 0.199 0.190 0.184 0.179 0.175 0.171 0.168 0.165 0.162
Atkinson (e =2.0) 0.659 0.621 0.600 0.588 0.580 0.575 0.571 0.569 0.568
Atkinson (e =2.5) 0.814 0.764 0.736 0.717 0.704 0.695 0.688 0.683 0.679
No Reform
Pensions Wages
With Reform
Pensions
Contribution rate to individual account
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  The second line of Table 2’s bottom panel report the Gini indexes arising from the multi-
pillar system implemented under different scenarios of contribution rates. The lowest value of 
the Gini corresponds to the lowest value considered for the contribution rate to the 
capitalization account, which is 1%. And the largest Gini corresponds to the highest value of 
contribution rate to the individual capitalization account. In any case, the pension inequality of 
the considered multi-pillar system scenarios (Gini 0.351 to 0.421) is always lower than that of 
the actual system (Gini 0.488). Similar results are observed for the Atkinson index until e = 
0.5. However, higher values of the inequality aversion parameter lead to changes in the ranking 
of preferred pension distributions. For example, any planner who is very averse to inequality 
(e = 1.0, e = 2.0 or e = 2.5) prefers the scenario with a contribution rate of 𝛼 = 9%, which is 
opposed to the case of a planner with e = 0.1 or e = 0.5 who prefers 𝛼 = 1% as this implies less 
inequality. However, this result is not entirely unexpected. As the aversion to inequality 
increases, more weight is given to the bottom part of the pension distribution; therefore, a 
distribution with more inequality at the end of the scale would be worst ranked (Atkinson, 
1970). In our sample, we have detected that the variation of pensions at the bottom of the 
pension distribution decreases when 𝛼 increases. The reason is that there are a large proportion 
of individuals receiving the minimum pension in the lowest deciles and some affiliates who 
cannot get this guarantee and obtain pensions below such level. This last group of individuals 
can accumulate more funds and have better pensions if 𝛼 is larger, so that the differences 
between their pensions and the minimum pensions can shrink. So, increasing the level of 
pensions of the worst-off individuals is more important for a planner who is very adverse to 
inequality. 
 
 
 
20 
 
Table 3: Ranking of social welfare functions 
 
 
 
 Apart from the analysis of inequality of future pensions, Table 2 also provides information 
on pension means so that we can readily compute Social Welfare Functions (SWF) as denoted 
in equations 14 and 15. The total pension average is 775.9 Soles a month in the actual system 
which is larger than any pension average of the multi-pillar system with a contribution rate to 
individual capitalization below 9%. So, all the considered reform scenarios produce a lower 
pension average with respect to the actual system with the exception of 𝛼 = 9%. However, the 
scenarios with higher 𝛼 also produce larger inequality, and therefore we need to compute SWF 
to decide which policy is preferred in reference to the other. Table 3 reports the ranking of the 
SWF computed for each scenario and inequality index. As indicated in equations 12 and 13, 
the SWF takes a point of view that focuses on the overall welfare of the pensioners and not on 
any individual in particular. In any case, the inequality adverse parameter of the Atkinson index 
indicates the extent to which the social planner cares about the poorer. 
 The scenario with 𝛼 = 9% ranks as the most preferred with the Gini or the Atkinson 
criterion. The scenario of no reform is the worst ranked with the Gini criterion, but this can be 
better ranked with the Atkinson criterion. For example, if the planner does not care too much 
about inequality (e = 0.1), the actual system is ranked as the second most preferred, and hence 
only the scenario with 𝛼 > 8% will be advisable to implement from a SWF point of view. The 
reason is that a contribution rate larger than 8% will produce a welfare level that is at least as 
good as in the actual system with no reform. In contrast, if the planner largely dislikes inequality 
No reform
α=1% α=2% α=3% α=4% α=5% α=6% α=7% α=8% α=9%
Gini 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Atkinson (e =0.1) 2 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 1
Atkinson (e =0.5) 4 10 9 8 7 6 5 3 2 1
Atkinson (e =1.0) 3 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 2 1
Atkinson (e =2.0) 6 10 9 8 7 5 4 3 2 1
Atkinson (e =2.5) 5 10 9 8 7 6 4 3 2 1
Contribution rate to individual account
With reform
Social Welfare Function
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(e = 2.5), the actual system is ranked fifth and hence only the scenario with 𝛼 > 5% will be 
advisable to implemented. 
 
 
Figure 3: Pension debt and social welfare function (with Gini)
Figure 4: Pension debt and social welfare function (with Atkinson, e=0.5)
Figure 5: Pension debt and social welfare function (with Atkinson, e=2.5)
Note: The percentages next to each obervation indicate the contribution rate (α) for the individual 
capitalization account
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 Each scenario of reform implies a different level of expected pension debt. Recall that if 
no reform is implemented the present value of the pension debt will be US$10,296 million. The 
analysis of SWF seems to suggest that if any reform is undertaken, the scenario with 𝛼 = 9% 
should be the most preferred, but in that case the pension debt will increase to US$10,541 
million. If one of the goals of the Government is to reduce the expected pension debt, then a 
contribution rate of 9% is unadvisable. To highlight these trade-offs, Figure 3 to 5 casts the 
relationship between different SWF and the expected pension debt for each reform scenario 
including the baseline case of no reform. In Figure 3 a social planner who favours the Gini 
criterion will find that a scenario of reform with a contribution rate somewhere just below 9% 
can improve the overall pensioners’ welfare and keep the actual pension debt levels. But if the 
policy is intended to reduce the pension debt, then the planner must chose a lower contribution 
rate to individual accounts. As the graph shows, any contribution rate produces a superior value 
in the SWF with respect to the scenario of no reform. 
 Figure 4 depicts the relationship between the expected pension debt and the SWF of the 
Atkinson criterion with a low inequality aversion (e = 0.5). We observe that the contribution 
rate to individual accounts cannot be lower than 7% in order to maintain the pensioners as well 
off as in the case of no reform. If the chosen scenario is precisely 𝛼 = 7%, then the Government 
can save about US$2,800 million, reduce the Atkinson index from 0.215 to 0.177 and maintain 
the pensioners with the same level of overall welfare. Therefore, for a planner with little 
concern for inequality and inclined to increase the welfare and reduce the pension debt from 
their actual levels, the preferred contribution rate will be between 7% and just under 9%. In 
contrast, Figure 5 illustrates the case of a planner with a high degree of aversion to inequality. 
In this case, the preferred contribution rate will be placed between 5% and just under 9%. 
Importantly, if 𝛼 = 5% is chosen, the pension debt can be significantly reduce by more than 
23 
 
50% (from US$10,296 million to US$4,749 million) while that the pensioners welfare is 
maintained at its actual levels. 
4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
 Although the values assumed for the parameters of the simulation are based mainly on 
empirical evidence, it is instructive to show the sensitivity of the simulation results to changes 
on some parameter values. Perhaps, the pension fund return rate ?̃? and the density of 
contributions (t1) assumed are the most debatable values. The results are much more sensitive 
to changes in the pension fund return rate than to density of contributions (see tables A1-A3 in 
the appendix). A multi-pillar pension system leads to larger savings in pension debt when the 
pension fund return is higher. For instance, if the return rate is more than 6%, any scenario of 
reform implies a debt reduction. In contrast, lower return rates limit the values of 𝛼 under which 
there is a debt reduction (e.g. return rates of 4% and 5% in table A1). The same relationships 
are observed for changes in the density of contributions, although the size of the variation in 
pension debt is smaller. This exercise is also interesting for policy makers because it allows 
identifying additional policies for enhancing gains from the reform.   
 As expected, higher pension fund returns lead to larger pensions but also wider pension 
inequality. However, the welfare position corresponding to the baseline scenario of no reform 
improves with the pension fund return. This in turn, imposes a limit for the value of 𝛼 under 
which pensioners may be as well off as they would be with no reform. For instance, the baseline 
scenario is ranked in fourth place (under the Gini criterion) when the return is 8%; and hence 
the rate 𝛼 must be larger than 6% in order to obtain a SWF with at least the same welfare level. 
Similar patterns are observed with the variation of the density of contributions. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
 In this paper we have shown that the actual design and conditions of the Peruvian pension 
system will lead to high levels of pension inequality and expected pension debt. According to 
our computations, the Gini index will be 0.488 and the present value of the pension debt will 
be US$10,296 million, which is about 11% of GDP. To address these problems, we have 
simulated a hypothetical multi-pillar pension system that unifies the public and private system 
of Peru and provides a minimum pension guarantee with a top-up scheme. In this proposed 
system, the affiliates will contribute a rate 𝛼 of wages to individual capitalization accounts and 
a rate 𝛽 of wages to a solidarity fund to finance out the top-ups for minimum pensions. 
Importantly, in terms of the transition for the new policy, the SPP affiliates will keep their 
actual pension balances. The results of the simulations are reported for different scenarios of 
contribution rates 𝛼 which are compared with the baseline case of no reform. 
 Our results indicate that the pension debt can be significantly reduced if the contribution 
rate for the individual capitalization account is low, although at the same time, this represents 
lower values for the social welfare function (SWF). In addition, pension inequality also declines 
with 𝛼 if the inequality is measured with the Gini index or with the Atkinson index when the 
planner is not too adverse to inequality. Looking only at the scenarios of reform that will 
maintain at least the same overall welfare as in the actual system and will not increase the 
expected pension debt, the simulations show that any 𝛼 just under 9% is feasible for a SWF 
that uses the Gini criterion. But if the SWF uses the Atkinson criterion with low aversion for 
inequality, 𝛼 should be between 7% and just under 9%. In contrast, if the SWF has a high 
degree of aversion to inequality, 𝛼 should be placed between 5% and just under 9%. All these 
results illustrates, that when one considers welfare, it is important to define the implied value 
judgments, which are not universally agreed upon. Thus, the goal of this study is not to advice 
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for a particular scenario of reform, but highlight the trade-offs that policy-makers have to make 
explicit in order to take the best possible option. 
 Of course, the government can be tempted to choose welfare preserving policies that 
achieve maximum reductions in the expected pension debt, so that the contribution rates (𝛼, 𝛽) 
could be set in (1%, 9%), (7%, 3%) or (5%, 5%) under the Gini, Atkinson low inequality 
aversion and Atkinson high inequality aversion criterion, respectively. However, some possible 
behavioural responses can deter the government from choosing low contribution rates for the 
individual accounts. For example, the mandate to contribute to the solidarity fund can 
disincentive high-income earners to contribute, so that the solidarity fund will be smaller and 
the expected pension debt will be larger. In addition, moral hazard can be at work if the 
implementation of a general minimum pension scheme discourages workers from contributing 
beyond the minimum period to be eligible. All these factors are important to have a complete 
picture but we are unable to address them due to the limitations of our data8. 
 The main lesson of the precedent analysis is that policy-makers must bear in mind that 
pension policies have different roles and effects to be considered. Making clear the trade-off of 
these policies will help to choose better and more appropriate reforms. 
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Appendix 
I. Computation of the actuarial liability 
 
 
A. Actuarial liability for insured of the SNP 
 
For insured ≤65 years old:   For insured >65 years old:  
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 And the total actuarial liability in the SNP is: 
 
snpsnp
snp RARARA 6565    
(A7) 
 
where: 
snp
ikRA  :   Actuarial liability for an individual i of age k. 
snp
kRA  :   Actuarial liability for all individuals of age k.     
 
kN       :   Number of individuals of age k 
in the sample.
     
 
snpRA 65  :   Actuarial liability for all individuals of age k≤65. 
 d         :   Discount rate. 
 
 According to equations A4-A6, insured older than 65 years retire immediately. Although 
not explicit in equation A7, we also consider in our calculations of snpRA  the actuarial liability 
of the survivors of the insured who die before retirement age. 
 
B. Actuarial liability for insured of the SPP 
 
Although the minimum pension ( sppPmin ) of the SPP is restricted to a small fraction of its insured, 
we must quantify the corresponding actuarial liability of these future payments: 
 
For insured ≤65 years old:   For insured >65 years old:  
y
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 Where sppSmin  takes value 1 if 
spp
ik
spp PP min  and the insured fulfils legal requirements to obtain 
a minimum pension; and zero, otherwise. 
 
 
C. Present value of contributions for insured of the SNP 
 
Since we retire workers at 65, the only contributors are the 64 years old or younger insured. 
The present value of contributions ( snpVP ) is the expected discounted value of all contributions 
made by the insured until they retire (our youngest insured in the sample is 21 years old): 
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D. Actuarial liability for insured of the new multi-pillar system 
 
This computation is similar to that carried out for the SPP’s insured. We also assume that the 
multi-pillar system provides a minimum pension for survivors, and that they always meet the 
legal requirements to obtain this benefit. Finally, we consider that the insured who is older than 
65 (at December 2006) receive the larger pension resulting from the comparison between the 
multi-pillar pension and the original system’s pension. This assumption is necessary to do not 
affect the rights of workers who have already reached retirement age. 
 
E. Present value of contributions for insured of the new multi-pillar system 
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II. Sensitivity analysis 
 
Table A1: Sensitivity of pension debt reduction (US$ millions) 
 
 
 
  
α=1% α=2% α=3% α=4% α=5% α=6% α=7% α=8% α=9%
Pension fund return rate
4% 6,851 5,774 4,627 3,416 2,142 814 -567 -2,003 -3,491
5% 8,331 7,349 6,278 5,120 3,882 2,568 1,182 -268 -1,782
6% 9,855 8,949 7,923 6,784 5,547 4,219 2,805 1,315 -245
7% 11,300 10,454 9,456 8,325 7,072 5,713 4,256 2,712 1,085
8% 12,618 11,832 10,857 9,716 8,433 7,025 5,499 3,873 2,164
Density of contribution (t 1 )
30% 9,060 8,218 7,264 6,205 5,054 3,818 2,500 1,109 -350
40% 9,265 8,401 7,425 6,344 5,171 3,911 2,571 1,156 -326
50% 9,855 8,949 7,923 6,784 5,547 4,219 2,805 1,315 -245
60% 11,533 10,524 9,367 8,075 6,667 5,149 3,536 1,837 63
70% 13,723 12,581 11,254 9,765 8,135 6,376 4,510 2,547 491
Contribution rate to individual account
31 
 
Table A2: Sensitivity of inequality and welfare measures to pension fund return rate ( r~ ) 
 
 
  
No 
reform
α=1% α=2% α=3% α=4% α=5% α=6% α=7% α=8% α=9%
4% 628.2 571.6 580.7 590.5 600.8 611.6 622.8 634.5 646.6 659.2
5% 694.4 601.0 612.4 624.6 637.4 650.9 665.0 679.7 694.9 710.6
6% 775.9 640.6 655.1 670.5 686.9 704.0 721.8 740.3 759.5 779.2
7% 876.5 694.2 712.7 732.4 753.1 774.7 797.2 820.4 844.2 868.7
8% 1001.1 765.8 789.3 814.1 840.2 867.3 895.4 924.3 953.9 984.2
4% 0.471 0.288 0.297 0.306 0.315 0.324 0.333 0.342 0.351 0.359
5% 0.479 0.317 0.327 0.337 0.346 0.356 0.365 0.374 0.383 0.391
6% 0.488 0.351 0.361 0.371 0.380 0.390 0.398 0.406 0.414 0.421
7% 0.499 0.388 0.397 0.406 0.415 0.423 0.430 0.437 0.443 0.449
8% 0.515 0.425 0.433 0.441 0.448 0.455 0.461 0.466 0.471 0.475
4% 0.202 0.128 0.130 0.133 0.136 0.139 0.143 0.146 0.150 0.153
5% 0.208 0.141 0.144 0.147 0.150 0.154 0.158 0.161 0.165 0.168
6% 0.215 0.156 0.159 0.163 0.166 0.170 0.173 0.177 0.180 0.183
7% 0.222 0.173 0.177 0.180 0.183 0.186 0.190 0.192 0.195 0.198
8% 0.231 0.192 0.194 0.197 0.200 0.203 0.205 0.207 0.210 0.211
4% 0.709 0.805 0.746 0.712 0.688 0.671 0.659 0.649 0.642 0.637
5% 0.715 0.808 0.753 0.722 0.701 0.686 0.675 0.667 0.661 0.656
6% 0.725 0.814 0.764 0.736 0.717 0.704 0.695 0.688 0.683 0.679
7% 0.737 0.825 0.779 0.754 0.737 0.726 0.717 0.711 0.706 0.702
8% 0.779 0.874 0.838 0.816 0.799 0.787 0.778 0.770 0.764 0.759
4% 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
5% 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
6% 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
7% 7 10 9 8 6 5 4 3 2 1
8% 4 10 9 8 7 6 5 3 2 1
4% 9 10 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
5% 6 10 9 8 7 5 4 3 2 1
6% 4 10 9 8 7 6 5 3 2 1
7% 2 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 1
8% 2 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 1
4% 7 10 9 8 6 5 4 3 2 1
5% 6 10 9 8 7 5 4 3 2 1
6% 5 10 9 8 7 6 4 3 2 1
7% 4 10 9 8 7 6 5 3 2 1
8% 3 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 2 1
Atkinson 
index 
(e=2.5)
Ranking of 
SWF with 
Gini
Ranking of 
SWF with 
Atkinson 
(e=0.5)
Ranking of 
SWF with 
Atkinson 
(e=2.5)
Outcome
Pension 
mean
Gini index
Atkinson 
index 
(e=0.5)
Contribution rate to individual account
Interest rate
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Table A3: Sensitivity of inequality and welfare measures to density of contributions (t1) 
 
 
 
No 
reform
α=1% α=2% α=3% α=4% α=5% α=6% α=7% α=8% α=9%
30% 764.6 639.3 652.8 667.3 682.6 698.6 715.3 732.7 750.7 769.2
40% 768.1 639.7 653.5 668.3 684.0 700.3 717.4 735.1 753.4 772.3
50% 775.9 640.6 655.1 670.5 686.9 704.0 721.8 740.3 759.5 779.2
60% 795.5 642.0 657.9 675.0 693.0 712.0 731.9 752.4 773.7 795.5
70% 821.6 643.8 661.5 680.6 700.9 722.3 744.7 767.9 791.9 816.5
30% 0.487 0.351 0.361 0.370 0.379 0.388 0.396 0.404 0.412 0.419
40% 0.487 0.351 0.361 0.370 0.380 0.389 0.397 0.405 0.412 0.419
50% 0.488 0.351 0.361 0.371 0.380 0.390 0.398 0.406 0.414 0.421
60% 0.490 0.352 0.363 0.373 0.383 0.393 0.402 0.411 0.418 0.426
70% 0.491 0.352 0.364 0.376 0.387 0.397 0.407 0.415 0.423 0.431
30% 0.214 0.156 0.160 0.163 0.166 0.170 0.173 0.176 0.179 0.182
40% 0.214 0.156 0.160 0.163 0.166 0.170 0.173 0.176 0.180 0.183
50% 0.215 0.156 0.159 0.163 0.166 0.170 0.173 0.177 0.180 0.183
60% 0.215 0.156 0.160 0.164 0.167 0.171 0.175 0.178 0.182 0.185
70% 0.216 0.156 0.160 0.164 0.169 0.173 0.177 0.180 0.184 0.187
30% 0.740 0.840 0.792 0.763 0.744 0.730 0.720 0.712 0.706 0.702
40% 0.731 0.826 0.776 0.748 0.729 0.715 0.705 0.698 0.692 0.688
50% 0.725 0.814 0.764 0.736 0.717 0.704 0.695 0.688 0.683 0.679
60% 0.722 0.805 0.755 0.728 0.710 0.698 0.690 0.683 0.679 0.675
70% 0.720 0.797 0.748 0.722 0.705 0.694 0.687 0.681 0.677 0.674
30% 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
40% 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
50% 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
60% 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
70% 9 10 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
30% 4 10 9 8 7 6 5 3 2 1
40% 4 10 9 8 7 6 5 3 2 1
50% 4 10 9 8 7 6 5 3 2 1
60% 3 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 2 1
70% 3 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 2 1
30% 5 10 9 8 7 6 4 3 2 1
40% 5 10 9 8 7 6 4 3 2 1
50% 5 10 9 8 7 6 4 3 2 1
60% 5 10 9 8 7 6 4 3 2 1
70% 5 10 9 8 7 6 4 3 2 1
Ranking of 
SWF with 
Atkinson 
(e=2.5)
Gini index
Atkinson 
index 
(e=0.5)
Atkinson 
index 
(e=2.5)
Ranking of 
SWF with 
Gini
Ranking of 
SWF with 
Atkinson 
(e=0.5)
Contribution rate to individual account
Outcome
desnsity of 
contributions
Pension 
mean
